By: James Thomas-Queh
The Perspective
Atlanta, Georgia
July 18, 2008
Discernment of the Problems
At the just ended forum organized under the theme:”Strengthening the Police to effectively Address the Crime Problem in Liberia” – the two main official speakers discerned some of the complex problems facing the LNP. First, it was admitted that the rank and file of the LNP was comprised of many inexperienced and unprofessional personnel. The reason given by the Deputy Police Commissioner (DPC), “Lots of qualified well trained and experienced police officers were dropped during the deactivation process” (see www.liberianobserver.com - 11 June 2008). This process did not only demoralise the LNP, but also put an extra burden on the few old officers left over. Additionally, the LNP is lacking everything from the supplies and logistics to fuel-oil to run the generators at the sub-stations at night (see www.theperspective.org - 1 May 2008). Yet from this pathetic state of the LNP, the DPC still made a passionate appeal for the Liberian people to trust and allow the LNP to be armed because “most of those armed robbers are armed to their teeth while the police have nothing to counter them” (see www.liberianobserver.com - 12 June 2008).
For his part, the Solicitor-General, conscious that his DPC’s appeal was unrealistic and non-receivable by the public – gave a total opposing opinion. He is against the arming on the ground that the LNP still needs training of mind and acquisition of some high level of professionalism. What matters the most, he said, “Was to work on the mind of the LNP by firstly making the public to see the police as a friend by creating a high level of respect for them” (see www.liberianobserver.com - 12 June 2008).
Exploring the Missing Links
Having clearly identified some of the problems facing the LNP, the two official speakers nonetheless felt short of divulging any solution or tangible progress made thus far. That is, the missing links. For example – if the deactivation was a serious error, what measures have since been undertaken or being implemented to overcome this problem? Will mass firing of the new recruits and re-employment of the old officers solve the problem or rather aggravate the situation? Or where could be found a middle ground, etc.? How much materials, logistics or supplies do the LNP need to be efficient and how much of that does it have currently? And at what point should we consider the LNP as having attained a high level of professionalism and ready to be armed? Or what is the precise qualm of the public against the police – its lack of professionalism, the calibre of officers, indiscipline or what other reasons?
Answering these questions could go a long way in making a better presentation of the case of the LNP to the Liberian public. But barely the forum had ended the Minister of Justice had already given some answers and this warning: “The appropriation for the LNP in the draft National Budget cannot effectively fight crime” (see The News – 7 July 2008). Imagine, the Budget Bureau has sliced his Ministry’s budget from US$30 million to US$14 million. And he added, “There are no quantity police officers, while the Ministry had anticipated a budgetary allotment for a 5 000 police force.” Of the current level of only 3 000 police officers, 2 000 officers are deployed outside of Montserrado county, while 30 new recruits are in training. Question: How many of the remaining 1 000 officers in Montserrado county are deployed in Monrovia? And dividing the rest of 2 000 by 14 counties, there are only 142.8 officers per county. To further add to this absolute neglect, dyfunctioning and confusion at the LNP, the President announced (see www.liberianobserer.com - 11 July 2008) a reassessment carried out by the British and Americans (and not by Liberians, please) for the re-vetting (or re-deactivation?) of 3 500 police officers. What will be its moral impact or destabilizing effect again on the LNP or financial cost? Is it a part of the Ministry of Justice projection and already sliced budget? What will be the duration of this re-deactivation process, etc.?
The LNP Controversial Leadership
If the public does not have confidence in the LNP to carry arms, is there any reason to believe that it has any in the LNP leadership? Apparently, this question was not on the agenda at the just ended forum. But if I were the Police Commission I would be extremely worried and frustrated that with a surging crime rate, the public categorically refuses to see my officers in arms.
That said, from the beginning the Liberian security apparatus has always been a male-dominated establishment. And second, a security apparatus is highly conservative; in difference to other institutions it does not accept or adjust so easily to certain changes, especially when abrupt, endless and imposed from outsiders. Thus the first blow to the moral of the LNP was when a female was designated as its head. What is more, without any time for this highly qualified, experienced and competent lady to impose her authority and mark, the LNP was already embroiled in restructuring and deactivation by foreign experts, where the “Director of Police” was transformed to a “Commissioner of Police,” etc. In essence, the LNP was being turned upside-down not by us but by the will of others. And don’t add the second re-vetting process yet.
In the midst of these profound changes (enough to destabilize and send even a genius spinning on his head) then came that very grave incident at the Free port of Monrovia between the LNP and the Port security in 2006. The report and recommendations from the President’s special commission that investigated the incident were not only damaging (in recommending the resignation of the Police Commission), but worst – the President’s response did little to clean up the public image of the LNP and its leadership. Because rather than losing the first and very capable female Police Commissioner of the Republic, the President decided instead to grant her a month training leave of absence to the United States.
Undoubtedly, this was a controversial decision, opened to many interpretations. In the process it also made the Police Commissioner to become a controversial figure, undermined her leadership authority and plunged the LNP into a deeper moral crisis. And for the highly professional, no-nonsense and independent LNP leadership – these have been the moments of an extreme discomfort and uncertainties. Because this incident had some semblance to that of the SSS in 2006, which resulted to the death of an individual. And the professional and moral authority of the SSS were not fully established until its controversial Director was finally transferred elsewhere. Under the same token, unless a similar measure is envisaged at the LNP, this organisation will take longer to recover its professional and moral credibility vis-à-vis the Liberian public.
The LNP, other security agencies, private security firms and UNMIL
Is the proliferation of private security firms (both local and foreign connected) or the UNMIL have an indirect impact on the development and progress of the LNP? I do think so. Is the rapid progress of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Special Security Service (SSS) have an indirect effect on the LNP? Undoubtedly.
The US government has recently delivered 18 vehicles to the SSS at the price of US$600,000.00; then another US$5 million for equipment, supplies, and training – plus an additional US$1 million worth of computers, uniforms, medical equipment, and security equipment. Well, there was even an SSS driver training course that took place in the United States (see www.liberianobserver.com - 10 March 2008). And the going is so good at the Agency that there is a need for a name change – from “Special Security Service” (SSS) to “Executive Protective Service” (EPS). Do you hear that? Ridiculous. Soon we will change the name “Liberia.”
And how could we dare to question the wisdom to professionalize and equip the security agency that guarantees the protection of our President. But while this good-will pours on the SSS – the LNP which is the enforcer of law and order throughout the country is in crisis and in need of every inch of support. If the situation should persist, I am afraid, there could be the unfortunate public perception that the President is more concerned about her own security than that of the general population. Thus if I were to advice the national leader, I would let the UNMIL and our own means handle her security and development of the SSS, while the larger portion of the Security Sector Reforms fund and our own resources be devoted to the LNP.
At the other extreme, the homes of most government officials, foreign embassies and NGOs, private businesses, and those with the means – are guarded 24 hours by private security firms. As for the masses of ordinary citizens who already sleep in darkness, they must keep a cutlass or a knife under their pillows or stay awake to protect themselves and families from the roaming bands of armed robbers. This is another perfect recipe for an anti-government sentiment because a minority elite is self-contained, protected, while the rest of the population is left at the mercy of God and criminals. Worst, it creates a generalized sentiment of insecurity, keeps away the needed professional Liberians and investors.
Perhaps if these foreign missions did not have to spend those millions on private security protection, they could afford to increase their financial aid to the LNP. And perhaps of if our government officials did not have to spend on their private security protection, they could avoid going that extra mile in corruption.
Then comes the UNMIL factor. According to one school of thought, it is due to the presence of this force that the public is not in any hurry to see the police in arms. But if this were the case, then the public must be extremely naïve since the unabated surge in criminality is taken place within the security net of the same UNMIL forces (after the LNP debacle) . The reality, perhaps, must be the government that is not given the LNP crisis the attention and urgency required because of its reliance the UNMIL. But the UNMIL is not there to stay.
Will arming the LNP remedy the surge in criminality?
The arming of a police is only a supplementary instrument of dissuasion, but not a means to an end. If the police cannot patrol because the force lacks logistics, then arming the LNP to fight crime is totally absurd. If a suspect is taken to a sub-station at night, where there is no light or paper to draft a report, then arming the LNP is almost useless. If the police does not have the capability to communicate between their units A and B or sub-stations C and D, then talking about arming is still too premature. In short, this headline from the Liberian Observer (11 July 2008) “Give Police Training, Logistics, Incentives and Nothing Else” perfectly summarizes the situation of the LNP and the predicament of the government. The mere absence of the police patrol around the capital in darkness at night is an enough inducement to create potential criminals.
However, were the LNP to be armed at a point, I would suggest to first start the experiment with a specially trained, well equipped, and supervised night patrol unit. The arms and ammunitions should not be assigned to the officers on a permanent basis; they must be deposited and controlled after each service to ascertain that each bullet fired by an officer must be accounted for. For this purpose a rigorously managed Department of Fire Arms must be established at the LNP.
Is the surge in criminality real or artificial?
There are several parameters to establishing criminal statistics – going from reported crimes, unreported crimes, resolved and unresolved cases, recidivists to non-recidivists, to the courts and prisons statistics, etc. From all indications we are very far from even a minimum of data collection since the police in the first line of action is dysfunctional. Thus, in the absence of adequate statistics the surge is dictated on the degree of our sentiment of insecurity – a sentiment that is currently very high. Or since the police is incapable of arresting the real criminals – there could be a real increase in the number of real criminal acts (but committed by a few organized and destabilizing rebel-gang criminal networks), and not a real increase in the number of criminals. We must hope not to be confronting a simultaneous increase in both crimes and criminals.
What is certain from reading between the lines, though, there is an alarming evolution in violent crimes. First, these crimes have evolved from the use of cutlasses and machetes to now fire arms and acid water poured on victims. And second, these crimes are also evolving into two distinct categories:
1. Those that are pure criminal homicides, where the victims are assaulted, killed and robbed, and
2. The rebel or rebellious murders and massacres (ex. The continuous killings from land disputes from the case of Bruno Michael at LAC to the incident in Maryland and recent massacre of 24 innocent farm workers in Bassa).
While the causes and motivations behind these crimes may be different and distinct – there is one common denominator of inducement that propels these criminals so easily. That is, the absence or non perception of a robust state authority in the counties with an effective police power to impose and maintain law and order.
And let me add, these “rebellious massacres” constitute the most dangerous evolution to our national security. The government must treat such incidents vigorously and distinctly; investigate the motivations and find the instigators. They are not mere criminals; they are still the residuals of the elements of destabilisation that must be treated as such.
Could the Death Penalty, vigilantes or neighborhood watch teams (NWT) curb the surge in violent crimes?
Understandably, a people, the innocent victims and their families in desperation and unprotected against the rising rate of violent crimes have the tendency to appeal for the application of the Death Penalty as a solace. But the long history of the Death Penalty has shown that it is neither a solace nor an effective punishment to fight crimes; it is a collective national murder - inhuman and archaic - an eye-for-eye or retribution only solution that no Godly and civilised nation should ever practice.
Second, the Death Penalty is absolutely against the Human Rights Charter of the UN – this World Body whose engagement has brought sanity and stability to Liberia. So how dare are we to demand our President to sign death warrants in the presence of the same UN and its forces? That will be an ingratitude on our part, isn’t it?
And third, if we do not have confidence in the LNP ( not excluding our entire crminal justice system), how do we trust its investigation that would send a suspected armed robber to the gallows? No. I beg that we pressure instead our President to give our Police, Courts, and Prisons just a 50% of their functional capacity, rather than appealing to her for the Death Penalty. Our collective national conscience will be at peace were our condemned murderers to pass the rest of their lives perpetually at the Post Stockade or even at the Zwedru Palace of the Correction to plant rice and cassava to feed the population.
The vigilantes or NWTs. The use of vigilante groups or the NWTs is symptomatic of a disorganized society, government’s impotence – especially in war. And I was very much surprised and disappointed that the President approved the participation of the “Neighborhood Watch Team” (that are not involved in vigilante activities) to strengthen security (see www.liberianobserver.com - 10 July 2008). I expected that she would have ordered, with immediate effect, the new AFL (yet untested and sitting idle), along with the LNP and the UNMIL to guarantee the peace and tranquillity of the people.
Is the situation of the LNP a reflect of the entire Liberian criminal justice system?
It is highly unlikely that the state of the LNP is not the identical picture of the entire Liberian Criminal Justice System. If the police as the front-line unit does not have the capability to apprehend suspected criminals and properly investigate them, then the courts and prisons are either emptied our overcrowded with only suspects and petit delinquents awaiting trial indefinitely.
As I have reiterated in previous columns, the criminal justice system is effective when all of its components work together in unison. On the contrary, when one unit is rusted, all the others become immediately clustered. The undesirable consequence then, they lost total public confidence.
Whose authority it is to order the arming of the country’s security apparatus – the President or the public?
The national security apparatus is the prolongation or the protector and enforcer of the authority of the state. Thus is my view that the arming or disarming of the security forces is the sole prerogative of the President and not the public. And this is in no way an attempt to ignore the public opinion in such a crucial national matter – democracy obliged. Because the public opinion is a message to the leadership that it is either taking its responsibility or neglecting it vis-à-vis the people and in the betterment of the nation.
But I could not imagine in my days (the same days of President Johnson-Sirleaf) that any amount of public pressure could have stopped a Varney Dempster or a Wilfred Clarke from arming the LNP in the face of a rampant surge in criminality, and that President Tolbert or President Doe could not have issued an immediate Executive Order to carry out the arming process. Of course, that is not only a mark of authority, but also assuming all the responsibility of having an unconditional confidence in the Minister of Justice and the Director of Police with the adequate support to carry out their mandate as expected by the people. On the contrary, there is an eminent danger to erode the state authority and power.
AUTHOR: A criminologist and social psychologist who has served in two previous governments of the Republic of Liberia. Contact: JM.Export@wanadoo.fr
© 2008 by The Perspective
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